Next, Farrell argues the district court confused the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis with the analysis required for summary judgment by failing to find defendants did not present sufficient evidence to show no triable issues of material fact remained. The familiar burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Doug*14las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) applies in FHA cases. Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 831 (2d Cir.1994). To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) he applied for., and was qualified to rent, the apartment; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the housing remained on the market. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381 (2d Cir.1994). If plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, defendant may rebut by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff the housing. Frazier, 27 F.3d at 831. Regardless of the burden shifting, the “[ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when a defendant meets its burden of production and gives a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, “the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — is no longer relevant.” Id. at 510, 113 S.Ct. 2742. Here, defendants met their burden of production by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for seeking to evict Farrell. Farrell thus had to raise a question of material fact as to whether a discriminatory motive fueled the eviction. The record is bereft of any evidence supporting his discrimination claims. Nor do we find Farrell’s insistence that defendants stated “there are issues which require a trial” — made in opposition to his summary judgment motion before their motion to dismiss was converted to one for summary judgment for the court — -persuasive. Thus, summary judgment was properly entered as no question of material fact was raised.