This, too, overextends the motion to dismiss inquiry. “We
have made th[e] point repeatedly” that “[t]he Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead legal the-
ories.” Zall v. Standard Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 284, 295 (7th Cir. 2023).
When reviewing a complaint on motion to dismiss, we ask
only whether the allegations make out a plausible claim, not
whether a plaintiff has chosen to pursue the right legal theory.
Farhan may not have packaged her allegations in a way that
satisfies the majority—in either her complaint or her briefs de-
fending the motion to dismiss. But her failure to do so is not
fatal at this stage of the case. Cf. Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software,
907 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Even where a plaintiff in-
itially asserts particular theories of recovery, unless the
change unfairly harms the defendant she is allowed to switch
course and pursue other avenues of relief as litigation pro-
gresses.”).
Moreover, Farhan still states a claim even under the legal
theory she did present to the district court: that Defendants
discriminated against her because of her Palestinian national
origin by discriminatorily enforcing her lease’s policy prohib-
iting hanging objects outside of windows. The majority dis-
poses with this theory by incorrectly asserting that Farhan
needed to plead “facts from which we can infer defendants’
intent.” Ante, at 9. According to the majority, Farhan might
have survived a motion to dismiss had she pleaded “that a
non-Palestinian tenant had flown a Palestinian or Israeli flag
without defendants’ intervention” or that the neutrality pol-
icy “only prohibited Palestinian flags in practice.” Ante, at 9.
But imposing that burden on Farhan is inconsistent with our
case law: a plaintiff need not plead “circumstances that sup-
port an inference of discrimination” to survive a motion to
dismiss her discrimination claim. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at
24 No. 24-1532