tenants also publicly display flags and artwork in their win-
dows” and “display Christmas or holiday decorations,” Far-
han makes no claim that such artwork and decorations plau-
sibly related to the Israel-Palestine conflict and would come
under the ambit of the “neutrality” policy.
Pointing out these deficiencies in Farhan’s complaint is
not “deciding issues of fact and construing inferences in favor
of the Defendants,” as Farhan suggests. At the pleading stage,
Farhan bears the modest burden of stating “only enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Orr v.
Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “This means that
the complaint must offer ‘factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged[.]’” Id. at 740–41 (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). And while we draw all infer-
ences in favor of Farhan, see Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843
(7th Cir. 2025) (en banc), we cannot draw inferences from facts
that are not alleged. Had Farhan alleged, for example, that a
non-Palestinian tenant had flown a Palestinian or Israeli flag
without defendants’ intervention, we could perhaps infer a
discriminatory intent in her favor. So too if she asserted that
the purported “neutrality” policy only prohibited Palestinian
flags in practice. But Farhan makes no allegations relating to
the national origin of other tenants or the application (or non-
application) of the “neutrality” policy to them. Simply put,
Farhan has not alleged any facts from which we can infer de-
fendants’ intent in applying the “neutrality” policy.
Farhan’s reliance on Bloch as a way around our pleading
standard is unavailing. To be sure, Farhan is right to analogize
her claim to the Blochs’; she is also challenging a conduct-
10 No. 24-1532