Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (2018)

Citation: Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (2018)
Parent Document: Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (2018)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2018-08-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8443663/wetzel-v-glen-st-andrew-living-... ↗

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That takes us to the main event: Is there a basis to impute liability to St. Andrew for the hostile housing environment? This question is new to our circuit. Our response begins, as it must, with the text of the statute. Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). Again, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate ... because of ... sex," and 42 U.S.C. § 3617 forbids a housing provider to "interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected by section ... 3604... of this title." The focus on the actor rather than the benefitted class, St. Andrew deduces, confines the world of possible defendants under these sections to those accused of carrying discriminatory animus. But St. Andrew relies on language defining the substantive contours of an FHA action to ascertain a landlord's potential liability for actionable abuse-in other words, it is looking at *863what is prohibited, not who is subject to those prohibitions. As the Supreme Court's cases in analogous areas demonstrate, the questions are different. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 526 U.S. 629, 639, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (distinguishing the scope of behavior proscribed under Title IX from availability of private suit); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 788-89, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (separating the analysis of the substantive contours of a forbidden hostile environment claim under Title VII from the rules for determining employer liability); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (telling lower courts to look to common-law principles for guidance on employer liability under Title VII). True, a sex-harassment claim under the FHA demands sex-based discrimination, but Wetzel has alleged such discrimination. On its face, the Act does not address who may be liable when sex-based discrimination occurs or under what circumstances. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 754-55, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (considering proper vicarious liability standard for an employer for purposes of Title VII).

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