Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Citation
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Parent Document
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Jurisdiction
- DC (municipal)
- Effective Date
- 2004-09-10
Other Sections in This Document (21)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
- Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 859 A.2d 1055 (2004)
Full Text
1,082 charsFurther, Dr. Hill consented to the entry of a judgment of possession in favor of G.E. Capital if he failed to repurchase the property on or before July 31, 2000. Thus on August 1, 2000, Dr. Hill not only knew that he could no longer challenge G.E. Capital’s right to possession, but also knew that he could be removed from the property at any time. Therefore, even if we were to accept Dr. Hill’s premise, that the notice provision of Rule 16(a) was also intended to serve as a notice to tenants that they were subject to eviction, Dr. Hill could not prove that he was injured by his failure to receive formal notice. To accept Dr. Hill’s premise, moreover, would require us to conclude, as a matter of law, that a holdover tenant with no lawful right to possession of certain property, is nonetheless entitled to remain on that property until the Marshals evict him or her. That is not the law in the District of Columbia. Once the judgment of possession was entered in this case, only G.E. Capital was allowed to lawfully be in possession of that property. See Brown v. Hornstein,