We are confronted at the outset with whether the lessee’s declaration that he was through repairing the building can be construed as an anticipatory breach of the lease. Plis brother continued to occupy the building and the rent was paid. When he made the statement that he was through making repairs there still were several years for the lease to run during which he could change his mind. The fact that no specific time was stated in the lease for the repairs to be completed persuades us that the doctrine of anticipatory breach, if applicable at all, should not here be rigorously applied. Although we have recognized the doctrine in Kentucky, just recently in Jordon v. Nickell Ky., 253 S.W.2d 237, decided in December, 1952, we refused to apply it so as to accelerate the due dates of future rental payments under an abandoned lease. In the case at bar, the lease was not abandoned, it contained no forfeiture clause for a breach of covenant or anything else, and only’ required that the appellant, lessee, should return the premises at the end of the lease “in the condition same will be when repaired as aforesaid.” In essence, the repairs to be made by the lessee were in the nature of rent or part of the consideration for the’ lease, and undoubtedly were a factor considered when the parties settled on $100 as the monthly rental. In Jordon v. Nickell we refused to permit an abandonment of the lease, which was a clear-cut breach, to precipitate or accelerate the due date of future rental payments under the lease. We hardly would be consistent in the case at bar if we permitted the declaration of the lessee that he was through making repairs to accelerate the time when they were to be completed or to vitiate the whole lease-. Consequently, we conclude that the lessee’s obligations were terminated by the fire in accordance with the terms of the lease itself, and that the judgment should be reversed. The judgment is reversed.