other person is not joined, [3] if and by whom this prejudice could have been avoided, [4] the possibility of other protective measures by the court, and [5] whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the event of nonjoinder. (See CPRL 1001(b)).
In the current action, HPD is a necessary party because it is the administrative agency that ordered the Decision and Certificate. Furthermore, the very purpose of the Article 78 petition is to challenge an action taken by their administrative agent. However, since the statute of limitations for joining HPD expired four months after the November 21, 2006 decision, this court is without jurisdiction to order the joinder, and it is therefore necessary to determine whether HPD is indispensable to this suit.
Weighing the CPLR 1001(b) factors, this court finds that dismissal [factor 1], would leave Mr. Clark without another means of recourse, as the statute of limitations as to HPD expired, and Mr. Clark could not properly re-file his action. There is, of course, some prejudice to HPD [factor 2], as the respondent notes, in that its material interest lies in ensuring the upholding of its decisions. However, in contrast, as a protective measure [factor 4] HPD had the opportunity to raise prevalent issues at the previous nonpayment suits, and additionally, has the ability to intervene to avoid any undue potential prejudice in any later proceedings. (See 27th Street Block Association v. Dormitory Authority of State of New York , 302 AD2d 155 (1st Dep't. 2002). Nonetheless, it is important to note that, by the time of filing, Mr. Clark had knowledge or constructively knew that HPD was the appropriate party, [factor 3] as all decisions and certificates received by Mr. Clark clearly came from HPD. Additionally, Mr. Clark alone had