The statute is written to protect the property interests of both landlord and tenant. If the former is successful in the district court, he is sure to get his rent, while the latter can maintain possession of the premises at least until the appeal is disposed of. This is a reasonable objective, and we do not for one minute question the authority of the legislature to condition any tenant’s right to continued occupancy of the premises during the pendency of an appeal upon the payment of rental monies into court. What it cannot do is also condition the right of appeal upon this payment when the appellant cannot pay because of poverty. An indigent person has no constitutional right to supersede a judgment without posting security, but he does have a constitutional right to one appeal without having to do so. Otherwise reasonable, the deposit provision of the statute becomes unreasonable when applied to a person who is unable to make the deposit because of poverty and, therefore, must be disregarded as to such a person.