The circuit court interpreted KRS 383.255 to mean that the appellant was required to pay into court rent which was due and owing or have her appeal dismissed. We cannot fault the circuit court for this interpretation because the clear implication of the statute is that if the money is not paid into court, the appeal is not “perfected” and, therefore, must be dismissed. However, when applied to an indigent person without sufficient funds to make the required payment into court, the statute creates a financial barrier between him and the circuit court which forecloses his avenue of appeal. Aside from any federal constitutional question which this might present, cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), we are convinced that as to such a person, the statute constitutes an unreasonable and, therefore, impermissible regulation of the exercise of the right of appeal secured by the Kentucky Constitution.