The arbitrariness and potential for extreme unfairness of a bright-line rule such as the limited "statutory opt-out" from a {**40 Misc 3d at 637}proceeding pursuant to RPAPL 713 (7), advocated in some of the above-cited cases, is well illustrated by the facts in the instant case. The young respondent herein is an unemployed woman, born and raised in India, whose family arranged a marriage for her to the petitioner's brother. The petitioner's family [*9]brought her to this country just a month before her wedding and provided her with a marital residence, the only home she has known since her arrival in this country and her marriage to the petitioner's brother over four years ago. They have lived together as a true family with all the indicia of a common home, financial support, and emotional interdependence. Her right to reside in the instant premises arises not merely from the petitioner's consent but from her marriage into the family. Since, technically, the petitioner has no legal obligation to support the respondent, the respondent would not have the theoretical protection of a "statutory opt-out" analysis and would be subject to eviction as a licensee, accomplishing for her brother what he himself could not accomplish himself, namely to evict his wife from the marital residence without provision for shelter or a single dime for support. If the legislature ever intended such an unjust result, which this court seriously doubts, then it needed to spell it out when it enacted RPAPL 713 (7).