"[t]his court finds that the premises in this case have been used as the family residence; in it respondents, now adults, have lived with petitioner, their father, and his wife, their mother, for nearly 30 years, making it their home. They continued to reside there in his absence, and there cared for their mother until her death. Under such circumstances, the petitioner could not, merely by walking out, constitute them tenants whom he may oust by summary proceeding." (Id. at 968.)
Thus far, the law seemed clear that not only spouses, but other immediate family members as well, could not be evicted from the family home as mere licensees by way of a summary proceeding, and that a petitioner who wished to oust a family member had to proceed by way of the less abrupt vehicle of an ejectment action in the supreme court. Then, in 2001, the case of Blake v Stradford (188 Misc 2d 347 [2001]) was decided, which seemed to cast doubt on this principle. In that case, the court decided that a petitioner could bring a summary proceeding against his ex-domestic partner on the theory that she was a mere licensee whose license had been revoked, although he could not also evict their children as their right to reside in the family home stemmed not from his permission previously given but{**40 Misc 3d at 633} from special rights incidental to the parent-child relationship. The court reached this conclusion in reliance upon Morone v Morone (50 NY2d 481 [1980]) which held, at page 486, that "cohabitation without marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which normally attend the marital relation." This court believes however that the Blake court's reliance upon Morone is misplaced because the above language is taken out of context. The Morone case was a "palimony" ca