activity includes "[a]ctions taken in good faith, by or in behalf of the tenant, to secure or
enforce any rights under the lease or rental agreement," the statutory warranty of
habitability, the statutory duty to repair, or "any other law of the state of New York, or of
its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States which has as its objective the
regulation of premises used for dwelling purposes." (Id. § 1 [b].) A
presumption of retaliation arises if the tenant served a notice to quit within one year after
the tenant engaged in protected activity; this presumption may be rebutted by the
landlord's establishing "a non-retaliatory motive for his acts by a preponderance of the
evidence. (Id. § 5.)
Defendant argues that because plaintiff served the notice of default on him a few
weeks after he moved for contempt in the prior action between the parties, a presumption
of retaliation has arisen that plaintiff has not rebutted—and therefore that he has a
defense to the validity of the default and termination notices. (See NYSCEF No.
60 at ¶¶ 29-30 [party affidavit]; NYSCEF No. 76 at 19-20 [mem. of law].)
This court disagrees.
As described above, the scope of protected activity under RPL § 223-b [1] [b]
encompasses actions to enforce a tenant's rights under the lease or rental agreement or
under New York statutes regulating residential premises. Defendant has not established
that his motion for contempt comes within that scope. The court's order in the prior
action denying the motion for contempt describes that motion as a request for "an order
finding defendants in civil contempt for violating a 2013 so-ordered
stipulation."[FN3]
(NYSCEF No. 82 at 1 [reproducing order].) An effort by defendant to enforce his rights