evidence that defendant tried to obtain vacant property insurance or renew his coverage;
(ii) defendant was given access to the apartment when he requested it; and (iii) insurance
defaults are incurable as a matter of law. (NYSCEF No. 83 at 9.) This court agrees with
plaintiff.
Defendant provides no basis—other than his own characterizations of what
his broker assertedly told him at an unspecified point in time—to show that he
would be unable to procure insurance if the repairs were not made or if he were not
residing in the apartment. (See NYSCEF No. 60 at ¶ 22 [defendant's
affidavit]. And in any event, defendant does not represent either that he took steps in the
months after the nonrenewal of the apartment's insurance policy to cure that default, or
that he ever attempted to obtain retroactive insurance coverage for the 2019-2021
period, as needed to protect the co-op "against the unknown universe of any claims
arising during the period of no insurance coverage." (Juan v 213 W. 28 LLC, 149 AD3d 539, 540 [1st Dept
2017] [internal quotation marks omitted].) Defendant has thus not shown that a material
dispute of fact exists about whether his default should be excused.
G. Whether Defendant has Established that a Material Dispute of Fact Exists
about Whether Plaintiff's Serving the Notices of Default and Termination were
Impermissibly Retaliatory
Defendant claims it has a defense to plaintiff's claims under Real Property Law
(RPL) § 223-b. This statute bars a landlord from "serv[ing] a notice to quit upon
any tenant or commenc[ing] any action to recover real property or summary proceeding
to recover possession of real property" in retaliation for protected activity.[FN2]
(RPL § 223-b [1].) As relevant here, [*5]protected