contrary intent. Where words in a statute are peremptory and used in contradistinction to
permissive words in the same statute, it will be deemed that the legislative intent was to make
such statute imperative. (Cf. People ex rel. Sherrill v. Guggenheimer, 28 Misc.
735; affd., 47 App. Div. 9.) And where the word "may" in a statute has been amended to the
word "shall," the courts will construe the amended statute as mandatory. (Rosenblum
v. Gorman, 21 App. Div. 618.) That exactly is the situation
here.
See also New York C R Co v Donnelly (8 AD2d 65,
69-70, 185 NYS2d 874, 878-879 [4th Dep't 1959])(citing three different treatises that discuss the
distinct meanings to be applied where the mandatory "shall" and the permissive "may" are used
in different sections of the same statute or in different clauses or sentences in the same section or
paragraph).
It is evident that HUD intends there to be a more elaborate and stringent set of requirements
during the recertification process than for termination of assistance generally and in fact
emphasized this by amending the relevant sections of its Handbook in June 2007 to substitute the
permissive word "should" for the mandatory word "must" for the information to be included in
the required 30-day notice and the method of its delivery.
While Petitioner put into evidence three notices it delivered to Respondent prior to
terminating her assistance, the one that meets the requirements of the HUD Handbook was the
second one, dated November 30, 2016, of which Respondent acknowledged timely receipt. The
November 30 notice, which was both hand-delivered and mailed, adequately advised Respondent
that she was being transferred to a specific 2-bedroom apartment — Apartment 5A at 1432