funds and is not required to be or is licensed by any governmental agency. As stated in
Metalsky v. Mercy Haven Inc., 156 Misc 2d 558, 566, 594 NYS2d 124, "[N]either
extensive government funding nor regulation necessarily transforms the actions of a private
entity into State action." The respondent must show that he has a constitutionally protected right
or interest in his apartment to trigger due process. There is no landlord-tenant relationship
between the landlord/owner of the subject premises and the respondent. The privity with the
landlord is solely with that of the petitioner lessor, not the subtenant lessee. Therefore, the
respondent has no property interest in the premises. (See, 757 East 169th Street HDFC v.
Haney, 171 Misc 2d 965, 656 NYS2d 92 (Civ. Ct. 1992 [Heymann, J.] Any license he may
have to the premises is provided to him pursuant to a sublease agreement which contains
conditions that must be met in order to remain in the premises. At this juncture, the issue remains
as to whether the respondent even has a binding agreement with the petitioner whereby he can
assert any rights to remain in the subject premises. Unless the respondent can prove at trial that
the "agreement" that he signed, and which petitioner claims it rejected, is in full force and effect,
the Court finds that commencement of this proceeding as a licensee proceeding was appropriate
and that petitioner did not have to demonstrate good cause. However, it would appear that if
"good cause" was required the petitioner would have had no difficulty in setting forth its reasons
for termination based on the prior correspondence between the parties and the respondent's
negative history with [*7]the petitioner. The petitioner's