The limited exception exists when a petitioner, prior to the termination of one proceeding,
commences another proceeding on the same grounds; if the second proceeding is commenced
prior to the termination of the first, it may be premised upon the notices used to support the first
proceeding (citation omitted).
In accord is Hudson Waterfront Assoc.IV, LP v. MTP 59 St. LLC, NYLJ,8/10/05,
p.25, col.2 (AT 1) and 808 West End Ave.LLC v. Pomeranz, NYLJ 1/10/07, p.23, col.1.
In 808 West End Ave.LLC v. Pomeranz the court dealt with a dispute as to whether a
second holdover proceeding using the same predicate notice was brought on the same day the
first proceeding was discontinued or the next day. Relying on DiCara v. Cecere, NYLJ,
4/18/79, p.13, col.5 (AT 2) [not required to serve a second predicate notice where landlord
commenced a second proceeding the very next day after the first was discontinued] and
Voldstad v. Ashley, NYLJ, 11/27/89, p.26, col.6 (AT 1) [second notice not required since
second proceeding was brought "shortly" after the first proceeding was dismissed], the court
found that under either set of facts, the respondent "suffered little prejudice thereby" and denied
the motion to dismiss.
This Court reaches the same conclusion and the motion to dismiss this proceeding on this
ground is denied.
GOVERNMENT ENTWINEMENT
The respondent asserts that the petition must be dismissed because this proceeding [*6]violates his due process rights. Relying on the case of 512 East
11th Street HDFC v. Grimmet, 181 AD2d 488, 581 NYS2d 24, (AD 1st Dept.), the
respondent argues that the petitioner, although a private entity, is acting as a governmental agent
because of the funding that it receives and the guidelines it must follow, and, therefore, it is