A review of the trial transcript provides no support for the implicit determination of the court below that plaintiff was not entitled to the return of the security deposit because defendant incurred at least $2,200 in expenses repairing the damage plaintiff allegedly caused to the apartment. To the extent the damages complained of were not attributable to normal wear and tear, defendant submitted no estimates or paid receipts at trial to prove the cost of his expenditures (see CCA 1804) and, therefore, he failed to prove the extent of his damages, if any. Thus, it cannot be said that the court's conclusions could be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (cf. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). In view of the foregoing, we find that substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1807).
We note that neither party is here arguing the position espoused in the dissenting opinion that plaintiff is entitled to a return of only half of the security deposit. Indeed, defendant seeks to defeat plaintiff's claim to the entire security deposit only on the ground that he is entitled thereto as a setoff for damage to the apartment. In fact, the record indicates that on the day that plaintiff vacated the apartment, defendant offered to refund to her $1,700 of the $2,200 security deposit. [*2]We should not speculate as to matters regarding which the parties themselves have raised no issue, especially where, as here, the record indicates that plaintiff's boyfriend had, in the past, raised the issue of his entitlement to a portion of the security deposit with defendant, and was referred by defendant to plaintiff.