4
Secretary, any proposed disposition of the project) and that
such comments are taken into consideration by the Secretary;
(2) project owners not interfere with the efforts of
tenants to obtain rent subsidies or other public assistance;
(3) leases approved by the Secretary provide that
tenants may not be evicted without good cause or without
adequate notice of the reasons therefor and do not contain
unreasonable terms and conditions; and
(4) project owners do not impede the reasonable
efforts of resident tenant organizations to represent their
members or the reasonable efforts of tenants to organize.
Although the “Rights of Tenants” heading may be rights-creating language, the
entire subsection directs the HUD Secretary to regulate project owners (i.e., landlords
receiving HUD assistance), not tenants. Thus, the statute focuses on those regulated and
on the regulating agency, rather than the class of beneficiaries. Under the Sandoval
Court’s analysis, this section does not confer an implied right of action. See Banks v.
Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying Sandoval to similar
HUD statute). And because the statute does not confer an implied right of action,
regulations enacted under the statute’s authority cannot confer implied rights of action
either.
The statement of purpose, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z–1b(a), also fails to demonstrate an
implied right of action.1 The broad purpose it conveys does not expressly identify tenants
as the sole beneficiaries. Rather, the section merely notes the “importance and benefits”
of tenant organizations. Tenant organizations may be just as important and beneficial to
landlords as they are to tenants. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not generally relied 1