ENTRY
This case concerns an eviction proceeding against Christa and Peter White, tenants
in Northgate Apartments in Burlington. The Whites’ landlord, Northgate Housing
Limited Partnership, initiated this proceeding allegedly because Christa White refused to
sign an amendment to her lease agreement. The Whites have counterclaimed that the
eviction was retaliatory, in violation of 9 V.S.A. § 4465, and that Northgate Housing has
violated their federal rights. The Whites have also filed a third-party complaint against
Northgate Residents Association, Inc., the tenant organization for the Northgate
apartment complex. The Whites allege that Northgate Residents violated several federal
rights and acted ultra vires. In their counterclaim and third-party complaint, the Whites
seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a dismissal of Northgate Housing’s
complaint.
Northgate Residents brings a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
V.R.C.P. 12(c), arguing that the Whites have no right of action by which they can assert
that Northgate Residents violated their federal rights and that the Whites’ ultra vires
claim is moot. Northgate Housing brings a motion for summary judgment, also arguing
that the Whites lack a right of action by which to assert that Northgate Housing violated
their federal rights. Northgate Housing also argues that the Whites cannot prove that the
eviction action was retaliatory, given that Christa White ultimately signed the lease
amendment.
The Whites agree that they no longer have a claim for ultra vires. Therefore, the
court dismisses this claim by stipulation of the parties. The court also dismisses the
Whites’ third-party complaint against Northgate Residents because the Whites have no
right of action, as discussed below. For the same reason, the court grants Northgate
Housing’s summary judgment motion with regard to the counterclaims regarding
violations of the Whites’ federal rights. Finally, the court denies Northgate Housing’s
summary judgment motion with regard to the retaliatory eviction counterclaim, because
the Whites have provided adequate evidence to demonstrate a dispute as to material facts.
The facts are largely undisputed. Where there are disputes, the court gives the
Whites, as the nonmoving party, all benefits of reasonable doubt.
Northgate Apartments is subject to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development regulations. This dispute began when Christa White refused to sign a lease
amendment that gave Northgate Housing the right to terminate a lease should a resident
engage in certain criminal activity in or around the apartment complex. Ms. White
believed that the amendment was not properly adopted by Northgate Residents. In the
winter and spring of 2003, Northgate Housing sent several notices to Ms. White that she
was in violation of her lease by not signing the amendment.
Ms. White had been active in organizing tenants to bring complaints before
Northgate Housing. She was active with the Concerned Residents of Northgate, Inc.,
which had complained to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development that
Northgate Residents was not properly independent from the property managers. Shortly
before Northgate Housing began eviction proceedings, she was elected to the Northgate
Residents Board of Directors.
Northgate Residents’s Board membership policy provides that each member must
be a tenant in good standing and in compliance with all the terms of the Northgate
Housing lease. After Northgate Housing began its eviction proceeding against Ms. White,
the Northgate Residents Board determined that she was not a tenant in good standing and
voted to remove her from the Board.
The Whites’ counterclaim argues that Northgate Housing brought the eviction
claim to retaliate against her for joining the Board in the first place. In support of this
argument, the Whites point to surrounding circumstances of the eviction and to specific
statements in a deposition of a former Northgate Residents employee. In essence, this
employee testified that Northgate Housing was furious that Ms. White had been elected
to the Board and used the eviction action as a means to get her off the Board.
The Whites also argue that Northgate Residents has violated several of Ms.
White’s federal rights, including her rights under HUD tenant organization regulations
and her First Amendment right to free speech.
The court first addresses the Whites’ arguments with regard to federal rights
before turning to the retaliatory eviction counterclaim.
Northgate Housing and Northgate Residents both argue that the Whites do not
have a cause of action under HUD statutes and regulations. Because HUD statutes do not
expressly confer a right of action, the Whites can bring their HUD-related claims only
through an implied right of action. In addressing implied rights of action, the Supreme
Court of the United States has drifted away from its mechanical, four-factor approach in
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to an approach whereby the primary goal is to determine
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. As the Court stated in
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001):
The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not
just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent
on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of
action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter
how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute.
Id. at 286–87 (citations omitted).