Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)

Citation: Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)
Parent Document: Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)
Jurisdiction: Vermont (state)
Effective Date: 2018-03-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10026703/moorcroft-v-severance/ ↗

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When construing a deed or other written agreement, the “master rule” is that the intent of
the parties governs. Kipp v. Chips Estate, 169 Vt. 102, 105, 732 A.2d 127, 129 (1999)
(internal quotations omitted). In discerning the intent of the parties, the court must
consider the deed as a whole and give effect to every part contained therein to arrive at a
consistent, harmonious meaning, if possible. Id. The court may consider “limited
extrinsic evidence of ‘circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement’ in
determining whether the writing is ambiguous,” which is a question of law subject to de
novo review. Id. at 107, 732 A.2d at 131 (quoting Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150
Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988)). Ambiguity exists if the extrinsic evidence, in
combination with the writing, “supports an interpretation that is different from that
reached on the basis of the writing alone, and both are reasonable.” Id. If the court
determines that a writing is not ambiguous, the plain meaning of the language controls
without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic evidence. Id. On the other hand, if the
court determines that the writing is ambiguous, interpretation of the parties' intent
becomes a question of fact to be determined based on all of the evidence—not only the
language of the written instrument, but also evidence concerning its subject matter, its
purpose at the time it was executed, and the situations of the parties. Mann v. Levin, 2004
VT 100, ¶ 17, 177 Vt. 261, 861 A.2d 1138.

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