¶ 14. We have distinguished statements of fact from statements of opinion in the consumer-fraud context, holding that misrepresentations of the former may constitute fraud while misrepresentations of the latter cannot. Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 133, 636 A.2d 744, 747 (1993). Defendants’ representations here of “quality construction” and “exceptional value” unquestionably fall within the category of opinion as subjective evaluations of workmanship rather than objectively verifiable statements of fact. See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 846 (Ill. 2005) (ruling 'that advertisement of “quality replacement parts” was mere commercial puffery, “the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined” and was therefore not actionable under deceptive practices act); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., *550723 A.2d 502, 512 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1999) (holding that representation of product as “most outstanding value” was expression of opinion not actionable under consumer protection act); Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 245-46 (Wis. 2004) (holding that advertisement of product as “premium quality” was “mere commercial puffery” incapable of “being substantiated or refuted” and therefore not actionable under state deceptive practices act (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claim.