cannot circumvent tribal immunity through a mere pleading device.’ ” (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) quoting Cook v. AVI Casino
Enters., Inc., 548 F. 3d 718, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2008)). And here, the activities
complained of—issuing and enforcing eviction orders—are squarely official in
their scope.
9
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No. 83456-8-I/10
In the context of Judge Dodge’s argument about judicial immunity, the
Rabangs contend that immunity did not apply because Judge Dodge was not
properly appointed. At oral argument, the Rabangs expanded this claim by
contending that the United States Department of Interior’s (DOI) December 2016
letter “invalidated” all tribal decisions taken after March 24, 2016, and therefore
that the DOI invalidated any authority possessed by Judge Dodge or the tribal
police.6 Because these arguments could also be made in the context of
sovereign immunity—asserting that Judge Dodge and the tribal employees are
not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were not acting in an official
capacity—we address them here.
First, we cannot analyze the tribal process that was used to appoint Judge
Dodge. “In general, Indian tribes possess inherent and exclusive power over
matters of internal tribal governance.” Rabang, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 1167. We
cannot analyze if Judge Dodge was acting in his “official capacity” during the
eviction proceeding without first considering whether he was appointed
appropriately under Nooksack law. Determining whether a tribal official “had
general authority to act on behalf of the tribe in a governmental capacity [is a]
pure question[] of tribal law, beyond the purview of the federal agencies and the