Rabang’s tort claims because the claims:
originate from and depend upon (1) the plaintiff’s right to continued
residency in Tribal housing located on Tribal trust land, and (2) the
propriety of the Tribe’s manner of eviction.
In adjudicating these claims, a state court would necessarily pass
judgment on the Plaintiff’s right to possession of real property
belonging to the Nooksack Indian Tribe and held in trust by the
United States. Such jurisdiction is flatly prohibited by
RCW 37.12.060. It is for the Nooksack Tribe, not this Court, to
resolve these claims.
RCW 37.12.060 had not previously been briefed by the parties.
4
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No. 83456-8-I/5
The Rabangs appealed.
ANALYSIS
The Rabangs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the case and
in denying their motion for reconsideration. Gilliland, Ashby, Dodge, and John
Does 1-10 (collectively “Gilliland”) contend that the dismissal and denial were
valid because of judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and the applicability of
RCW 37.12.060. We conclude that sovereign immunity precludes subject matter
jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.
Outsource Servs. Mgmt., LLC v. Nooksack Business Corp., 181 Wn.2d 272, 276,
333 P.3d 380 (2014). “Washington State courts generally have jurisdiction over
civil disputes in Indian country if either (1) the State has assumed jurisdiction
pursuant to Public Law 280[5] or (2) asserting jurisdiction would not infringe on the
rights of the tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them.” Outsource Servs.
Mgmt., 181 Wn.2d at 276-277.
Public Law 280 was enacted by Congress in 1953 to permit “states to