The first error assigned is the action of the court below in refusing to permit the introduction of evidence tending to prove an oral warranty of the condition of the building. The rule that, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, oral evidence cannot be admitted to alter, add to, or contradict the terms of a written contract, is so familiar that it would §eem needless to cite authorities. This rule is applicable to evidence offered for the purpose of establishing an oral warranty, where, presumptively, the parties have reduced their entire contract to writing. (Naumberg v. Young, see Vol. 44 N. J. Law, 331, 43 Amer. Rep. 380; McLean v. Nicol (Minn.), 45 N. W. 15; Snead v. Tietjen (Ariz.), 24 Pac. 324. See, also, Sanford v. Gates, 21 Mont. 277, 53 Pac. 749; Gaffney Mercantile Co. v. Hopkins, 21 Mont. 13, 52 Pac. 561; Mast v. Pearce, 58 Iowa 579, 8 N. W. 632, and 12 N. W. 597; Fisher v. Briscoe, 10 Mont. 124, 25 Pac. 30; Anderson v. Perkins, 10 Mont. 154, 25 Pac. 92; Stevens v. Pierce (Mass.), 23 N. E. 1006; DeWitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 306, 10 Sup. Ct. 536; Brady v. Henry (Cal.), 12 Pac. 623.) The court, therefore, did not err in excluding all evidence having a tendency to show that plaintiff, contemporaneously with the making of the lease, or prior thereto, warranted by word of mouth the condition of the building, or promised to lay a new sidewalk, or ceil the cellar. Nor may defendants base their defense and counterclaim upon the breach of an implied warranty of fitness, for in the lease of a house there is no implication of warranty that the property is fitted for the use for which it is let, or that it. is suitable for any purpose, or that it shall remain in a tenant-able condition. (Blake v. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 38 Pac. 1032; Gear on Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 99.)