Kunst v. Pass, 1998 MT 71 (1998)

Citation: Kunst v. Pass, 1998 MT 71 (1998)
Parent Document: Kunst v. Pass, 1998 MT 71 (1998)
Jurisdiction: Montana (state)
Effective Date: 1998-03-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/884766/kunst-v-pass/ ↗

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¶15 Plaintiffs next contend that the five-day limit did not begin to run until
the District Court entered the judgment on September 10, 1996. Because they
filed their bill of costs that same day, they maintain that they were thus well
within the statutory time period. But it is well-settled that where a case
involves a jury trial, as opposed to a bench trial, the time period begins to run
on the day following the jury verdict and not on the entry of the judgment.
R.H. Grover, Inc. v. Flynn Ins. Co. (1989), 238 Mont. 278, 288-89, 777 P.2d
338, 344. In Grover, this Court noted that in a bench trial, the judge has more
latitude than a jury as to when it will render its decision. In such a case, the
time period is computed from the day the court enters its judgment, and not
when the court orally announces its decision. The oral announcement of a
decision, which may be subject to changes when the court finally enters the
judgment, is not comparable to the jury rendering its verdict. Thus, in a jury
trial, the time limit begins to run on the day after the jury enters its verdict.
Grover, 238 Mont. at 288-89, 777 P.2d at 344. See also Rocky Mountain
Enterprises, Inc. v. Pierce Flooring Carpet Barn (Mont. 1997), __ P.2d __, __,
54 St. Rep. 1410, 1417 ("[T]o claim costs under § 25-10-501, MCA, the
plaintiffs had five days from the date of the jury verdict to file and serve upon
the adverse party a verified memorandum of costs.")

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