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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 980241.pdf

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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 980241.pdf
Jurisdiction
Washington (state)
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This understanding of the nature of the security deposit is consistent with recent revisions
to the URLTA, which clarify that the security deposit remains the property of the tenant and that
the landlord’s interest in the deposit is limited to a security interest. REVISED URLTA (2015) §
1202(a)(1) & cmt., 7B U.L.A. at 259-60 (2018).
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As Silver and amicus curiae point out, the Court of Appeals erroneously stated that Silver
did not assert that he did not cause excessive damage to the apartment. Silver, 10 Wn. App. 2d at
680. In fact, the complaint alleged that “Mr. Silver was not responsible for the allegedly excessive
wear and tear to the premises.” CP at 5.
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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Silver v. Rudeen Mgmt. Co.
No. 98024-1

excessive or resulted from “ordinary use of the premises.” Id. But if Silver prevails

on the merits of his complaint, Rudeen must return Silver’s deposit in full. RCW

59.18.280(2).

This analysis leads us to conclude that the three-year statute of limitations

contained in RCW 4.16.080(2) applies to a tenant’s claim to recover their deposit

under RCW 59.18.280. The deposit is the tenant’s personal property, which the

landlord holds in trust unless and until the tenant breaches their obligations. Thus,

Silver’s action is one to recover his personal property and it is subject to the three-

year statute of limitations. See Luellen v. City of Aberdeen, 20 Wn.2d 594, 604, 148

P.2d 849 (1944). The two-year catchall statute under RCW 4.16.130 cannot apply to

a tenant’s action to recover their personal property because it applies to only those

actions that do not fall within any other statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.130 (The