Section 4956
- Citation
- Section 4956
- Parent Document
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Jurisdiction
- Maine (state)
- Effective Date
- 1988-05-26
Other Sections in This Document (64)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
- Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (1988)
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Full Text
935 charsI am mindful that many of our municipalities have not heretofore required condominium and apartment developments to secure approval as subdivisions under section 4956(1) and that our trial courts have in some cases upheld those municipal decisions. Section 4956(4) prohibits any sale, lease, or conveyance for consideration of any subdivision not municipally approved as a subdivision. To prevent uncertainty as to existing structures, I would follow the precedent of the court set forth in Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 1001-02 (Me.1982); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 640 (Me.1979), and Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1274 (Me.1976). Accordingly, I would apply this interpretation of section 4956(1) to the litigants in this case but otherwise only to those applicants who have not to date taken substantial steps in reliance on final approval of their applications under other applicable land use statutes and ordinances.