Briggs v. Chase, 105 Me. 317 (1909)

Citation: Briggs v. Chase, 105 Me. 317 (1909)
Parent Document: Briggs v. Chase, 105 Me. 317 (1909)
Jurisdiction: Maine (state)
Effective Date: 1909-04-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5118602/briggs-v-chase/ ↗

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In Holley v. Young, supra, it was declared that the intention of the parties, as inferred from the object, purpose and phraseology of the whole instrument, should control the interpretation of the words, "agree to lease” and that they were sufficient to constitute a lease in presentí. This, like the case at bar, was an action of forcible entry and detainer against the tenant who claimed the right of possession, not because he had given any written notice that he desired a new lease, nor because a new lease had been given, but from the single *324fact that he had continued to occupy, as appears from the following remark of the court: "The tenant after the expiration of a year remained. His so remaining is an election to continue the tenancy.”

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