II
As their second claim of error, the defendants contend that the trial court should have considered the equitable doctrine against forfeiture. Implicit in this charge is that the trial court either failed to consider or incorrectly rejected the doctrine of nonforfeiture. Now that we have abandoned our former rule that equitable defenses are unavailable in a summary process action, the trial court could properly have relied upon these principles. Danpar Associates v. Falkha,37 Conn. Sup. 820, 823, 438 A.2d 1209 (1981); Mark I *Page 345
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sendele, 37 Conn. Sup. 569,572-73, 427 A.2d 1352 (1981); Steinegger v. Fields, 37 Conn. Sup. 534, 536, 425 A.2d 597
(1980). It is elementary that a court of equity, even in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake may grant relief to prevent a forefeiture resulting from the breach of a covenant to pay rent upon payment or tender of all arrears of rent with interest. Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 655,115 A. 219 (1921). "Equity will intervene where `the delay has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally' the conditions of the lease." Nicoli v. Frouge Corporation, 171 Conn. 245, 247, 368 A.2d 74
(1976), quoting F. B. Fountain Co. v. Stein,97 Conn. 619, 626-27, 118 A. 47 (1922); see Galvin v. Simons, 128 Conn. 616, 620, 25 A.2d 64 (1942). The defendants' argument is unsupported by the trial record. Examination of the record discloses that the court considered application of the doctrine and rejected it in this case.