The plaintiffs, F and V, sought to recover damages from the defendants for
the alleged wrongful termination of their employment in violation of
the statute (§ 31-290a) prohibiting discrimination against employees
exercising their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 31-275
et seq.). The plaintiffs were two of five special police officers who
worked for the defendant Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport
(board), and their work included patrolling the neighborhoods around
the schools. In 2012, the Bridgeport Police Department assumed author-
ity over security for the public schools in Bridgeport, and the plaintiffs
began reporting to G, a supervising officer with the Bridgeport Police
Department. The plaintiffs then began performing duties outside of the
school area, including handling regular police calls. In February, 2014,
F sustained an injury to his back during the course of his employment
for which he sought and received workers’ compensation benefits. When
F informed G of his need for back surgery, G made certain disparaging
comments toward him. In November, 2015, V sustained a work-related
injury to his wrist for which he sought and received workers’ compensa-
tion benefits. When he returned to work, he spoke with G about having
surgery, but G turned the conversation to the topic of F’s back surgery
and again made certain disparaging comments. At a regular meeting of
the board in June, 2016, the board voted to pass a motion to eliminate
the five special police officer positions, along with 125 other positions,
from the board’s 2016-2017 budget, because the Bridgeport School Dis-
trict was facing a financial crisis. The plaintiffs were laid off from their
positions effective August 12, 2016. Following the elimination of the
special police officer positions by the board in 2016, the plaintiffs’ union
filed a grievance against the defendant city of Bridgeport (city) and the
board, alleging a violation of a no layoff provision in a memorandum
of understanding between the parties. The matter went to arbitration
before an arbitration panel, which determined, in July, 2018, that the
memorandum of understanding had been violated, and ordered the rein-
statement of the five special police officers. Subsequently, the plaintiffs
were notified that when they returned to work, they would receive layoff
notices, as funding had never been restored for the special police officer
positions and the memorandum of understanding had expired in June,
2018, and was no longer applicable. The plaintiffs then commenced this
action, and the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed
by the city and the board, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held:
1. This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court
improperly focused or limited its analysis of their discrimination claim
to the 2016 layoffs because their claim encompassed the events related
to the 2018 reinstatement order and the defendants’ 2018 postarbitration
conduct, as that claim was not properly before this court: in their appel-
late briefs, the plaintiffs did not provide any argument or analysis or
cite to anything in the trial court record that would demonstrate why
the court was wrong in determining that the discrimination claim before
it pertained only to the 2016 decision of the board to eliminate the
special police officer positions, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for
reconsideration or articulation of the court’s decision on this issue, and it
was not the responsibility of this court to search the record to determine
whether the trial court’s determination found support in the record;
moreover, the trial court expressly stated in its decision that any claim
concerning the 2018 reinstatement order was not before it and never
addressed or decided any such claim, and it would be fundamentally
unfair to the defendants for this court to review a claim that was neither
addressed nor decided by the trial court; furthermore, the defendants
objected to this court’s consideration of the plaintiffs’ discrimination
claim as it related to the events in 2018, and the plaintiffs did not assert
the existence of any exceptional circumstances to warrant this court’s
review of a claim not decided by the trial court and failed to raise any
claim in their brief challenging the trial court’s determination that the
sole issue before it concerned the board’s 2016 decision.
2. The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment because no genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case that their positions
were eliminated and they were laid off in 2016 in violation of § 31-
290a for exercising their rights to workers’ compensation benefits and
whether the alleged nondiscriminatory reason given by the defendants
for the plaintiffs’ layoffs was pretextual:
a. Although the plaintiffs claimed that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether they met their burden of establishing a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under § 31-290a, this court did not
need to reach the merits of that claim, and, as was done by the trial
court, this court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs both met
their initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.
b. On the basis of this court’s plenary review of the evidence submitted
in support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment,
this court agreed with the trial court’s conclusions that the defendants
successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination and that the
plaintiffs failed in their burden of producing evidence to show the exis-
tence of a genuine issue of material fact that the nondiscriminatory
reason offered by the defendants was not worthy of credence or was
pretextual: the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants in
support of their motions for summary judgment provided substantial,
uncontroverted support for the defendants’ asserted nondiscriminatory
reason for eliminating the special police officer positions and laying off
the plaintiffs in 2016, namely, that the funding for the special police officer
positions was eliminated due to financial considerations; moreover, the
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of
material fact that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by
the defendants was not worthy of credence or was pretextual, as they
provided no evidence contradicting, inter alia, the affidavits submitted
by the defendants from five of the board members who participated in
the vote to eliminate the positions that confirmed that the plaintiffs’
workers’ compensation claims were not a factor in their decision, no
evidence showing any connection whatsoever between the board’s deci-
sion to defund and eliminate the special police officer positions and the
plaintiffs’ filing of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and no
evidence providing evidentiary support for their assertion that the board’s
decision was retaliatory in nature and connected with their protected
status under § 31-290a; furthermore, the plaintiffs’ assertions were con-
clusory and speculative, and were not sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact to defeat summary judgment, especially when it was
undisputed that the defendants treated all of the special police officers
the same.
Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 16, 2024 Procedural History