termination would be effective (see Town of Islip v Kismet Park
Corp., 38 Misc 3d 131[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52410[U] [App
Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]), and the conse-
quences for the tenant upon termination (see e.g. New York
City Hous. Auth., Gun Hill Houses v Rosario, 65 Misc 3d
1205[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51500[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County
2019]). Here, the notice of nonrenewal satisfies this standard.
It clearly and unambiguously indicates that the lease would
not be renewed, that respondent was directed to vacate by
August 31, 2024, and that petitioner would commence eviction
proceedings if respondent failed to vacate by that date.
However, additional requirements are imposed on notices
when the termination in question is predicated upon some
specific cause. These notices must identify the legal basis for
the termination and the supporting facts with a level of
particularity ‘‘reasonable[ ] in view of all attendant circum-
stances’’ (Hughes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept
1996], lv dismissed & denied 90 NY2d 829 [1997]). Reason-
ableness under this test requires that a notice include suf-
ficient facts to allow the tenant to frame a legal defense and
otherwise defend their tenancy (Jewish Theol. Seminary of
Am. v Fitzer, 258 AD2d 337, 338 [1st Dept 1999]). While this
standard was originally articulated in the context of rent-
regulated tenancies, courts have applied it broadly to include
those circumstances where cause is required under contract
provisions (see Rascoff/Zsyblat Org. v Directors Guild of Am.,
297 AD2d 241, 242 [1st Dept 2002]), federal due process protec-
* While the notice in question is denominated a notice of intention not to
renew rather than using the language of termination, it nevertheless func-