Respondent’s motion asserts two similar but distinct argu-
ments for why dismissal is required—first, that the notice of
nonrenewal failed to provide sufficient facts regarding the al-
leged nonpayment, and second, that the petition’s lack of detail
regarding the nonpayment rendered it deficient under RPAPL
1076 86 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, 3d SERIES
741 (4). These arguments—each apparently presenting an is-
sue of first impression in the GCEL context—will be addressed
in turn.
A. The Notice of Nonrenewal
On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court
must afford pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as
alleged in the petition as true, accord the petitioner every favor-
able inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged
fit into a cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83,
87-88 [1994]). The court may also freely consider any affidavits
or proof offered by a petitioner to remedy defects in the peti-
tion (id. at 88).
The relevant facts are these. On May 17, 2024, petitioner
served upon respondent a document titled ‘‘Ninety (90) Day
Notice of Intention not to Renew Tenancy’’ (the notice of nonre-
newal). This notice, required under Real Property Law § 226-c,
stated in relevant part that ‘‘pursuant to Real Property Law
§ 216 (1) (a) (i), the [petitioner] has good cause for removal or
eviction because you have failed to pay rent due and owing.’’
(See notice of nonrenewal, NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF]
Doc No. 3 at 2.) Beyond this, the notice is silent as to respon-
dent’s nonpayment.
Respondent argues that this notice is deficient under the ap-
plicable legal standards, and thus that the proceeding must be
dismissed. She notes that predicate notices in summary
proceedings must be ‘‘definite and unequivocal’’ (Garsen v Ho-