Constitution, article II, § 8, and therefore does not violate its
provisions.
Next, noting that a voter’s ability to understand the ballot is
fundamental to the ability to cast his or her vote (see Puerto
Rican Org. for Political Action v Kusper, 490 F2d 575, 580 [7th
Cir 1973]; Madera v Detzner, 325 F Supp 3d 1269, 1279 [ND Fl
2018]; Torres v Sachs, 381 F Supp 309, 312 [SD NY 1974]; see
also OCA-Greater Houston v Texas, 867 F3d 604, 614-615 [5th
Cir 2017]; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 USC § 10503), the
Board argues that the City defendants’ provision of language
services is so ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ with the acts of receiv-
ing and completing the ballot and casting and recording votes
that it must be considered akin to the provision of receptacles
for completed registration forms, which the Court of Appeals
found to be improper in Clark. This argument is unavailing.
That an interpreter’s services may be necessary for a voter
to intelligently exercise his or her franchise does not make
those services part of the Board’s functions in distributing bal-
lots to voters, or receiving, recording or counting the votes.
Nothing in the description of the program or the training
materials suggests that the City defendants intend that the
program’s interpreters are to take on the Board’s role with re-
spect to the ballots. In fact, the training materials expressly
direct the interpreters not to engage in electioneering or politi-
cal discussions, not to mark the ballots for the voters, and to
swear to the affidavit required by the Board if they enter the
voting booth with the voter.6 Providing interpreter services
under the program is no more involved in the Board’s responsi-
bilities than the state agency distribution of, and the assis-