tion as applied to the use of locked receptacles was,
under the circumstances, properly issued’’ (id. at
192-193).
[1] In considering the impact of Clark on the determination
here, the Board asserts that, unlike the executive order at is-
sue in Clark, the City Council’s budget allocations for the
interpreter program in the budgets for fiscal years 2017, 2018
and 2019 effectively render the program a law for purposes of
NY Constitution, article II, § 8. While the budget adopted by
the City Council undoubtedly has the force of a law (see NY
City Charter §§ 254, 255, 256; Matter of Mohr v Greenan, 10
Misc 3d 610, 612-613, 615 [Sup Ct, Erie County 2005], affd 37
AD3d 1094 [4th Dept 2007]), the Mayor’s earmarking of certain
appropriations for a particular administrative program in the
proposed budget, and the subsequent approval of the budget by
the City Council, does not render said program the equivalent
of a law.5 Indeed, if the mere earmarking of funds for an
administrative or executive program made the program a law,
virtually all executive and/or administrative actions could be
deemed to constitute laws, since such actions are all enabled to
some extent by a legislature approving a budget. Thus, the
5. While the City Council can add, subtract or omit funding for a unit of
appropriation in approving the budget, the budget approval process is not a
means for the City Council to otherwise alter the program at issue (NY City
Charter § 254 [a]).
884 65 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, 3d SERIES
court finds that since the interpreter program, much like the
executive order at issue in Clark, was not enacted by a legisla-
tive body (see Clark, 66 NY2d at 191, citing Schumer v Caplin,
241 NY 346, 351-352 [1925]), it is not a law for purposes of NY