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Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-10-15

Other Sections in This Document (60)

Full Text

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A
          The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
       rendered judgment for the defendant because she did
       not assert as a special defense that she cured the viola-
       tion of the no-smoking policy. The defendant responds
       that she pleaded the special defense of cure because
       her ‘‘answer can easily be construed as pleading the
       equitable doctrine against forfeiture as a special defense
       which incorporates cure as one of its elements.’’ We
       agree with the plaintiff.
          Our resolution of this claim ‘‘requires us to interpret
       the defendant’s pro se answer. As a consequence, the
       issue before the court invokes our plenary power to
       review the legal effect of pleadings.’’ Vanguard Engi-
       neering, Inc. v. Anderson, 83 Conn. App. 62, 65, 848
       A.2d 545 (2004). ‘‘A defendant’s failure to plead a special
       defense precludes the admission of evidence on the
       subject. . . . Although our courts are consistently
       . . . solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants, the rules
       of practice cannot be ignored to the detriment of other
       parties. . . . It would be fundamentally unfair to allow
       any defendant to await the time of trial to introduce
       an unpleaded defense. Such conduct would result in
       trial by ambuscade to the detriment of the opposing
       party.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon,
       36 Conn. App. 432, 436–37, 651 A.2d 281 (1994). In a
       summary process action, ‘‘[i]f a tenant claims that a
       breach can be and has been remedied and is no longer
       continuing, the tenant should state those claims in a
       special defense to the summary process action.’’16 Hous-
       ing Authority v. Martin, supra, 95 Conn. App. 814.
       the court’s consideration of an unpleaded special defense, we need not
       address this additional claim.
         16
            ‘‘This is consistent with Practice Book § 10-50, which provides in relevant
       part: ‘No facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except
       such as show that the plaintiff’s statements of fact are untrue. Facts which
       are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the
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