Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-10-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10136084/milford-redevelopment-housing-... ↗

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notice that ‘‘failed to specify where [the defendant]
          smoked and did not indicate when the alleged violation
          took place.’’ In support of her argument, the defendant
          relies on a footnote in Presidential Village, LLC v.
          Perkins, supra, 332 Conn. 54 n.10, that states: ‘‘[I]f the
          lack of specificity in a notice discourages the tenant
          from taking steps to cure the default, it also could impair
          the tenant’s ability to establish an equitable defense to
          eviction.’’ The pretermination notice in the present case,
          however, provided the defendant with the information
          necessary for her to defend herself against possible
          eviction. Specifically, it identified the lease provision
          that the defendant violated, stated that she had smoked
          within twenty-five feet of the building, and included a
          copy of the no-smoking policy. Moreover, the pretermi-
          nation notice included a cure provision that informed
          the defendant that she had thirty days to remedy the
          violation. We cannot conclude that the information pro-
          vided by the plaintiff to the defendant ‘‘discourages
          [her] from taking steps to cure the default’’ or ‘‘impair[s]
          [her] ability to establish an equitable defense to evic-
          tion.’’ Id. Accordingly, the pretermination notice com-
          plied with federal and state law, and the court, there-
          fore, had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
                                               II
            Having concluded that the court had subject matter
          jurisdiction over this summary process action, we now
          turn to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal. The plaintiff
          claims that the court (1) improperly rendered judgment
          for the defendant because she did not assert as a special
          defense that she cured the no-smoking policy violation,
          and (2) applied an incorrect legal standard to find that
          the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant had not
          cured her violation of the no-smoking policy.15 We
          address each claim in turn.
            15
               The plaintiff also claims that the defendant could not cure her most
          recent violation of the no-smoking policy because she had violated it on
          several occasions. Because we agree with the plaintiff on its claims regarding
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