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Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)

Citation
Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Parent Document
Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2025-08-26

Other Sections in This Document (68)

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was not defective so as to deprive the trial court of
          jurisdiction. The requirement imposed on the plaintiff
          by the court in this matter simply is not found in the
          statutory language or our case law. The notice to quit
          set forth specific instances of conduct by the defendant,
          such as his assorted arrests, his use of illegal narcotics,
          his allowing others to consume narcotics, his threats
          to a neighbor, and his allowing unauthorized occupants
          to reside in the premises. Furthermore, the notice to
          quit also generally informed the defendant that such
          conduct was done in violation of the lease agreement,
          the rules and regulations of the plaintiff, his statutory
          obligations as a tenant pursuant to § 47a-11, and consti-
          tuted a nuisance. It is not required that the plaintiff
          identify the specific lease provisions or statutes that
          such conduct violated. See General Statutes § 47a-15.
          It is ‘‘inconceivable’’ that the defendant was not aware
          of the conduct that formed the basis of the termination
          of his lease. Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App.
          439, 452–53, 473 A.3d 318 (1984). Accordingly, we con-
          clude that the court improperly determined that the
          notice to quit was invalid or defective.
                                        II
             The defendant claims, as an alternative ground for
          affirming the judgment of the trial court, that the plain-
          tiff’s notices did not comply with federal notice require-
          ments, and, as a result, the court lacked subject matter
          jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that the plaintiff’s
          notices were insufficient under federal law because
          they informed the defendant only that he was entitled
          to a grievance hearing if such a proceeding was appro-
          priate. We are not persuaded.
            ‘‘When a defendant is a tenant of federally subsidized
          housing, federal law must be followed in addition to
          state law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford
          Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin,
          supra, 228 Conn. App. 603; see also Presidential Village,
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