Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)

Citation: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Parent Document: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10659980/housing-authority-v-cyr/ ↗

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therefore, the summary process complaint was subject
          to dismissal. Specifically, it argues that the court erred
          in its conclusion that the ‘‘notice to quit fails to provide
          sufficient detail for the defendant to be apprised of
          what portions of the lease the defendant was in violation
          of’’ because the relevant statute and case law do not
          contain such a requirement of specificity. We agree.
             As an initial matter, we note that, ‘‘[b]efore the [trial]
          court can entertain a summary process action and evict
          a tenant, the owner of the land must previously have
          served the tenant with notice to quit. . . . As a condi-
          tion precedent to a summary process action, proper
          notice to quit [pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional
          necessity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Subur-
          ban Greater Hartford Realty Management Corp. v.
          Edwards, 123 Conn. App. 295, 299, 1 A.3d 1138 (2010);
          see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson,
          supra, 124 Conn. App. 734. Simply stated, there is no
          subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid
          notice to quit. Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn. App. 278,
          281, 109 A.3d 543 (2015). Finally, we note that the notice
          to quit terminates the lease between the parties. Towers
          v. Kelly, supra, 199 Conn. App. 837; see also Waterbury
          Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc.,
          292 Conn. 459, 466, 974 A.2d 626 (2009); St. Paul’s Flax
          Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, supra, 735.
             In his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that
          the plaintiff listed ‘‘specific allegations of actions . . .
          taken . . . by the defendant’’ in its notice to quit rather
          than setting forth ‘‘the reason or reasons for the notice
          to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory
          language or words of similar import . . . .’’ He further
          contends that the notice to quit fails to identify which
          allegations of improper behavior amount to a violation
          of the statutory provision cited, nor does it state which
          lease provisions are alleged to have been violated. In
          conclusion, the defendant claimed that, ‘‘[b]ecause the
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