Driscoll v. Toll MA Ltd. Partnership, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 345 (2009)

Citation: Driscoll v. Toll MA Ltd. Partnership, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 345 (2009)
Parent Document: Driscoll v. Toll MA Ltd. Partnership, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 345 (2009)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2009-12-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8357328/driscoll-v-toll-ma-ltd-partnership/ ↗

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The court concludes that the drainage and structural defects alleged in the February 2007 demand letter were set forth with sufficient specificity to put the defendants on notice of the unfair and deceptive practices alleged. See G.L.c. 93A, §9(3); Simas v. House of Cabinets, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 131, 139 (2001) (“A demand letter under G.L.c. 93A, §9, must. . . reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered”); Piccuirro v. Gaitenby, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 286, 292 (1985) (demand letter must “reasonably set forth the acts relied on and was sufficient to give the defendant an opportunity to review the facts and the law to see if the requested relief should be granted and to make a reasonable settlement offer so as to limit damages”). Although the plaintiffs did not make special reference in their initial demand letter to each particular structural defect that they now allege, the case law does not require such specificity with respect to claims of additional defects arising out of a cause of action that has already been reasonably described. Cf. Bressel v. Jolicoeur, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 205, 211 (1993) (plaintiffs Chapter 93A claim based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentation foreclosed where demand letter made “no reference to this particular act”). Here, the demand letter reasonably described the alleged unfair and deceptive acts, and the court finds no basis for requiring serial demand letters to account for each new defect that arises from the same conduct.8 ORDER

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