Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Citation
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Parent Document
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts (state)
- Effective Date
- 1997-06-27
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8352844/clegg-v-vaughan/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (22)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
- Clegg v. Vaughan, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 (1997)
Full Text
1,056 charsVaughan is correct that the case file in the District Court reveals that, in his answer to interrogatories, Clegg stated that the rent was $750 per month, that there were no rent increases, and that he received a $375 security deposit and $750 for the last month’s rent from Vaughan on December 15,1992. In addition, a copy of the lease between the parties verifies these figures. Nonetheless, a summary process action filed in Superior Court pursuant to G.L.c. 239, §5 is not an appeal in which the court reviews the record below, but rather is a trial de novo. Thus, Vaughan was obligated to present to this Court any evidence she wished considered. As noted, supra, a pro se litigant is not excused from compliance with the rules of evidence. See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., supra at 141 (holding that where a pro se plaintiff failed to formally introduce certain evidence to the court, he could not claim error based on said evidence on appeal). Accordingly, this Court’s dismissal of Vaughan’s counterclaim under G.L.c. 186, §15B(2)(a) was proper.