Gifford v. Sears, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 716 (2005)

Citation: Gifford v. Sears, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 716 (2005)
Parent Document: Gifford v. Sears, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 716 (2005)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2005-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8355893/gifford-v-sears/ ↗

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The Appeals Court first determined that the word “building” in §51 was limited, by the words preceding it in the statute, to structures that had a “commercial or public” use. Santos v. Bettencourt, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 90, 93 (1996). That decision declared owners of single-family houses excluded from the strict liability provision of the statute. The Appeals Court then extended the exclusion to residential condominium units in Orsono v. Simone. See 56 Mass.App.Ct. 612, 619-20 (2002) (“Condominium common areas are not inherently ‘public’ in the same sense as the specific structures identifiedin [G.L.c. 143, §51); theywerenot designed and maintained for continuing public assembly”). However, in distinguishing the condominium unit from residential buildings that may be subject to *719strict liability, the Orsono Court implied that “large apartment building[s] or even a smaller two- or three-family tenement building” may not enjoy the benefit of the exclusion. 56 Mass.App.Ct. at 619.

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