In Stuart, Judge Gantz points out that the Festa decision was based upon the 1965 version of the statute before the provisions were inserted establishing the State Building Code Commission for purposes of promulgating a State Building Code and the provision requiring the injury to have arisen from egress from a fire was repealed. 2004 WL 557187, at *2-3; see Festa v. Piemonte, 349 Mass. 761 (1965). Judge Gantz further argues that the Supreme Judicial Court’s reliance on Festa was misplaced when it limited applicability of the 1972 version of the statute to those plaintiffs who used egresses to escape from fire, despite the 1972 repeal of this language. Stuart 2004 WL 557187, at *2-4; MacAllister, 429 Mass. at 301. Moreover, the Appeals Court, though cognizant of the 1972 revisions, nonetheless also ruled that the “appropriate circumstances” for recovery under G.L.c. 143, §51 were those in which a violation of the State Building Code results in a injury to someone fleeing a fire, citing MacAllister as controlling authority. Fox, 54 Mass.App.Ct. at 582. This Court, like Judge Gantz, recognizes that even if MacAUister is not controlling because of its mistaken reliance on a case that interpreted the earlier version of G.L.c. 143, §51, Fox is controlling authority despite this Court’s opinion that strict liability is imposed for any violations of the State Building Code and not restricted to the particular fire safety violations. If the court were to apply the Fox court’s narrow interpretation of G.L.c. 143, §51, then the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the strict liability claim should be allowed because the plaintiff does not allege that she was injured while fleeing a fire. However, if the motion were allowed, the case would still proceed to trial on the negligence claim and evidence as to the violation of the State Building Code would still be admissible on the issue of negligence. The only practical consequence at trial of the allowance of this motion for partial summary judgment would be that the jury would not make a specific finding as to whether the defendants violated G.L.c. 143, §51 and whether such a violation caused the plaintiffs injury, because such findings would not be necessary to resolve the negligence claim.