M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- Citation
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- Parent Document
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts (state)
- Effective Date
- 2019-02-21
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7178777/mlm-v-em/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (24)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
- M.L.M. v. E.M., 123 N.E.3d 802 (2019)
Full Text
1,057 charsThe remaining question for the judge was whether the plaintiff's fear was reasonable. On that issue, a plaintiff need not wait for an actual incident of serious physical harm to occur before obtaining a c. 209A order. The defendant had physically pushed her, destroyed or damaged her property, unlocked doors that she had locked to keep him away, and removed the video cameras that she had installed as a deterrent to his harming her. The plaintiff testified that the frequency of the defendant's behaviors was escalating. The defendant's conduct went beyond causing the plaintiff to feel mere "[g]eneralized apprehension, nervousness, [or] feeling aggravated or hassled." Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998). The judge, who was able to evaluate both parties' demeanor, see Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 487 (2005), was entitled to find that the plaintiff's fear was reasonable, and that the risk of serious physical harm was imminent. Certainly we cannot say that his implicit finding on that point was clearly erroneous.