Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Citation
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Parent Document
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts (state)
- Effective Date
- 1998-07-28
Other Sections in This Document (14)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
- Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)
Full Text
897 charsFinally, the judge declined to declare the assignment void on the grounds that it was champertous, as asserted by Royal. The judge’s analysis, based as it was on the applicable case law at the time of his decision, was correct. See Pupecki v. James *249Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 219 (1979); Berman v. Linnane, 424 Mass. 867, 870 (1997). More recently, however, the Supreme Judicial Court has extinguished what little life remained in that ancient principle. See Saladini v. Righellis, 426 Mass. 231, 235 (1997) (“[w]e also no longer are persuaded that the champerty doctrine is needed to protect against the evils once feared”). The focus is now upon whether a challenged agreement to finance a law suit involves excessive fees or whether “recovery by a prevailing party is vitiated because of some impermissible overreaching by the financier.” Id. at 236. Neither factor appears in this case.