Rubenstein v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 244 (1998)

In 1962, the Legislature enacted St. 1962, c. 730, § 1, which was modeled on the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors *246Act (contribution act). See G. L. c. 23IB, §§ 1-4. The statute is silent as to whether a right of contribution can be assigned to a nontortfeasor, and thus the question of assignability must be answered in accordance with common law principles. It is well settled that most property damage claims and contract actions are assignable. See Larabee v. Potvin Lumber Co., 390 Mass. 636, 640-643 (1983) (“[t]here is no general obstacle in principle to the assignment of a cause of action for tort”). See also Goldman v. Noxon Chem. Prods. Co., 274 Mass. 526, 529 (1931) (plaintiff’s written assignment of his claim for commissions to his attorney was valid). On the other hand, claims for personal injury cannot be assigned, General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 363 (1944), nor can some contract rights be assigned when expressly forbidden by the terms of a contract or by statute, see American Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Medford, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 22 (1995), or when substitution would materially change the duty or risk of the obligator. Garber’s Auto Rental Inc. v. Genoa Packing Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 301-302 (1974).