was-seemingly-whether the term "actual damages" in the civil remedies
provision of the Privacy Act of 197 4 includes compensation for mental and
emotional harm. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. But because the Privacy Act of 1974 applied to
4
The majority asserts that we said the opposite in Washington State Physicians
Insurance Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
Majority at 9. It is true that in Fisons we disallowed recovery of emotional distress
damages under the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, which affords "actual
damages." Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318. But that was not just because ofRCW 19.86.090's
language allowing an individual "to recover ... actual damages sustained." (Emphasis
added.) In fact, we explained that there was no right to emotional distress damages in that
context because the statute limited the right to sue to a "person who is injured in his or her
business or property by a violation of [the act]." RCW 19.86.090 (emphasis added). In
Fisons, we ruled, "'The phrase "business or property" also retains restrictive significance.
It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered."' Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931
(1979)). The statute at issue in this case, in contrast, contains no such limiting language.
9
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
damages from the government, the question was actually narrower: "because the
Privacy Act waives the Federal Government's sovereign immunity, the question we
must address is whether it is plausible to read the statute, as the Government does,