tenant is entitled to recover. The statute's plain language defies such a reading. The
statute says "that exceed," which refers to an amount, not a type of damages.
Second, this interpretation treats the language "that is payable" as a limit on "actual
damages" when, grammatically, it can be read only as modifying the immediately
preceding phrase "relocation assistance."
B. The Majority's Holding Conflicts with This Court's Decisions
Interpreting the Term "Actual Damages" in Other Statutes
In addition to failing to recognize the broad nature of the statutory language,
the majority rejects the definition of "actual damages" established by our prior
2
See Cornu-Labat v. Hasp. Dist. No. 2, 177 Wn.2d 221, 231, 298 P.3d 741 (2013)
("We interpret statutes to give effect to all the language used so that no portion is rendered
meaningless or unnecessary." (citing State v. JP., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318
(2003))).
5
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
decisions. Majority at 7-8. In Rasor, we interpreted the term "actual damages" as
used in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
87 Wn.2d at 529. This statute permits a plaintiff to recover "an amount equal to ...
any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure" of a credit
reporting agency to comply with the statutory requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n,
1681 o. The plaintiff in Rasor alleged that a credit report stating she had a reputation
of living with more than one man out of wedlock "damaged her personally and in
her business reputation in the small community, and that she suffered emotionally