Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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while the NLRA does not. It argues that this industry-wide union requirement usually

makes it difficult for a group of employees at a single airport to unionize, and that in

most cases a group of employees at a single airport would need their employer to

voluntarily recognize them in order to have a legitimate union. Filo Foods contends

that Proposition 1 forces employers to voluntarily recognize unions at SeaTac because

the only way for an employer to get out of the ambit of Proposition 1 is to negotiate a

collective bargaining agreement. However, Filo Foods's argument is essentially a

reformulation of the argument we rejected in the NLRA context above-that

Proposition 1 "upsets the balance of power between labor and management by placing

non-union employers in positions where they will be required to recognize unions in

order to avoid the Ordinance." Filo Foods's Opening Br. at 37. Like our conclusion

32
  FilaFoods,
LLC
 v.City
       
of SeaTac
89723-9

above, we hold that the RLA does not preempt Proposition 1 and we affirm the trial

court.

The RLA was originally designed to prevent labor disputes from hindering

interstate commerce in the railroad industry, and Congress extended the RLA to cover

the airline industry in 1936. 45 U.S.C. § 152; Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat.

1189 (currently codified as 45 U.S.C. § 181). The act itself states that it is the duty of

both employers and employees in those industries to