Section 4
- Citation
- Section 4
- Parent Document
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts (state)
- Effective Date
- 1985-04-22
Other Sections in This Document (85)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
- Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (1985)
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Full Text
1,074 chars*642To this general rule, Massachusetts decisions have carved an exception given expression in Lipson v. Southgate Park Corp., 345 Mass. 621, 625-626 (1963), Holihan v. Rabenius Builders, Inc., 355 Mass. 639, 642 (1969), and McMahon v. M & D Builders, Inc., 360 Mass. at 59-60. All three cases involve house builders, i.e., there was a separate agreement to construct or repair a building upon the premises to be conveyed. In those circumstances it was plausible to reason that the obligation to build was collateral to the undertaking to convey. It was also reasonable to suppose that a purchaser from a builder-vendor would rely on the contractor’s possessing the skill to build a house which is habitable. For a discussion of illustrative cases, see 12 Williston, supra, § 1506A. In the case now before us there is no undertaking collateral to conveyance of the premises. The seller had no obligation to fix anything, to remove anything, or to add something. Nothing needed doing if the buyers decided, after investigation, that the conditions of conveyance had been met.