This reasoning is wrong. By renting the apartment the defendant warranted its habitability. Boston Housing Authy. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184 (1973). He was cognizant of conditions, particularly the lack of adequate heating facilities, that rendered it uninhabitable. These facts, as is explained by the decision in Shaw v. Rodman Ford Truck Center, Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 711-712 (1985), compel the conclusion that the defendant, at the very least, had made a wilfully false representation in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 9, because he had “made the representation without knowing whether it was true or false and with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.”5 74. at 712, quoting from Computer Sys. Engr., Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365, 1375 (D. Mass. 1983), aff’d, 740 F.2d 59, 68 (1st Cir. 1984). Neither the failure of the defendant to apprise himself fully of the law, nor his misapprehension of what he did know about his obligations, is sufficient in the circumstances to negate the conclusion that his conduct runs afoul of the penalty provisions of G. L. c. 93A, § 9.6 Cf. Berman v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196 (1979). The “willful or knowing” requirement of § 9(3), goes not to actual knowledge of the terms of the statute, but rather to knowledge, or reckless disregard, of conditions in a rental unit which, whether the defendant knows it or not, amount to violations of the law. See Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 627 (1978). Cf. Grossman v. Waltham Chemical Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 932, 934 (1982).